Kant on Moral Praiseworthiness vs. Moral Worth

When and where

Date and time

Wed, Sep 9 · 12:00 p.m.EDT — local Toronto time

Location

Larkin Building, Room 20015 Devonshire Place, University of Toronto, Toronto, onToronto

About this event

In this talk, I focus on Kant’s claim that certain actions – like the Sympathetic Helper’s in Groundwork I – are morally praiseworthy yet do not have moral worth, and I provide a novel account of what this notion of *moral praiseworthiness* as distinct from *moral worth* is about. I argue that a morally praiseworthy action is an action done from an emotion that displays a certain quality, namely emotional aptness. One’s emotion displays this quality if it is the result of the subject training her faculties to react to a certain object/state of affairs in a way that she judges appropriate. I argue that this notion of moral praiseworthiness (a) fills a gap in the literature, (b) can be clearly distinguished from the notion of moral worth within Kant’s ethics, and (c) highlights how *two distinctively moral forms of evaluations* – i.e., moral praiseworthiness and moral worth – can fulfill different roles within Kant’s moral theory. Martin Favaretto https://www.martinafavarettophilosophy.

Official details

Tickets:

Official ticket page for Kant on Moral Praiseworthiness vs. Moral Worth

Price:

Free

Organizer:

The Toronto Philosophy Meetup

Listing source:

meetup

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